the direct and indirect expropriation of the RTF As has been widely noted in recent days, the call-back from INPS of the TFR is not conveyed by the employees to a pension fund, depriving businesses of a basic form of self-financing. I read often provide an answer to this objection that time, however, companies would have lost this form of self-financing with the reform of the pensions, because in any case the money not the TFR would remain in business. In giving questa risposta del tutto superficiale e che dimostra quanto meno una scarsa conoscenza del funzionamento delle imprese in Italia, si dimenticano tre fatti importantissimi:
il primo : mentre la decisione di trasferire il TFR ai fondi pensione, è una scelta del singolo, implicando questo fatto che tale trasferimento sarebbe stato graduale, anche e soprattutto per la poca propensione iniziale dell’Italia all’utilizzo di questi strumenti, l’avocazione da parte dell’INPS della quota non trasferita ai fondi pensione è immediata e tutta in un'unica soluzione, creando una crisi di liquidità per molte aziende;
il secondo : si sottovaluta il tipo di rapporto che intercorre between employee and company in an SME, would not it evident that an employee of an SME decides to transfer the money into a fund rather than keep them in business, because in these contexts, employees participate in corporate decisions to proactively because the state of health of the company depend on both their future and their professional growth in a much more stringent than a large company. Even more so, to encourage this behavior many more companies were gearing up to make it more advantageous not to transfer the TFR. The third
: Regardless of the problems that would still have had an SME with the transfer of part or all of the TFR corporate funds to pension funds, we forget that there is a huge difference between the transfer of funds from the productive sector (SMEs) to another productive sector (pension funds, management of these), as would happen with respect to a transfer from the productive sector ( always SMEs) to a totally unproductive and uneconomical, as the INPS. In the first case, in fact, the money continues to circulate and even stimulates the growth of a sector we have still not widespread, also highly likely some of these funds were reinvested in companies in the form of private equity, indirectly conveying the TFR is still in business. In the second case, INPS will use the windfall for unspecified development projects, as we have already seen, usually are neither productive nor able to act effectively in the recovery industry, geography, social situation which they are addressed. Moreover, the employee will not be able to exercise any control, can not say in any way "because I do not like where I recover my money invested and put them somewhere else." These aspects
immediate and direct impact on businesses and on the productive part of the Advocate of the TFR is not conveyed to the pension funds by INPS, but there are also negative indirect effects that will companies even more difficult: it is the entry into force, in 2008 the International Agreement on regulatory capital of banks, commonly known as Basel 2.
I would first point out that although the 2008 is still missing more than a year, the reality is that in order to achieve the targets for banks on that date, the same as those used in every respect the rules laid down by Community legislation in the decision-making process lending.
Since Basel 2 requires banks to quantify the risk to businesses who are granted credit, and determining the new severance pay on a reduced capacity for self-financing dell’azienda, a parità di altre condizioni, si può pensare che il rischio legato all’impresa aumenterà, determinando come effetto indiretto appunto, la minore capacità della stessa di ottenere credito in un momento, sempre a causa della mancanza di tale forma di autofinanziamento, in cui si troverà ad averne davvero bisogno. In ultimo, tale difficoltà generalizzata in tutto il comparto delle piccole e medie imprese nell’ottenere credito a causa dell’aumentato rischio creerà le condizioni per un maggiore tasso di fallimento a livello di sistema, indicatore, tra gli altri di recessione economica.
Ma vediamo più in dettaglio come agisce Basilea 2 e soprattutto come sia possibile che si determini the scenario described above.
As I said above, Basel 2 is nothing but an international agreement on the level of regulatory capital that banks must hold against the risks taken in pursuit of their core business, which is to lend money. The fact that hesitates a second, due to the fact that there has been over time (the first agreement dates back to 89) an evolution of the methodology of calculating the regulatory capital, with the dual aim of better protecting investors by ensuring greater stability to the system banking, and especially to allow a more accurate and precise quantification of this capital, which remains unused at the end of protecting investors, but that is just therefore a cost to the bank which will not get fruit (giving up a possible profit).
As the level of capital to be held in accordance with the rules of the first agreement, very rigid and not differentiated by the actual risk assumed, banks taking risks, "low" because loans to economic health were to hold the same level of unused assets instead of a bank which held a portfolio of risks instead of paying a substantially higher economic actors in a state of distress. The second Basel Accord and then corrects this biasing effect of the credit market reaching the goal of rewarding the banks that best are able to manage risk.
But what it depends on the quantification of regulatory capital?
trying to simplify as much as possible, we say that essentially depends on the probability of insolvency of an economic entity for which the bank lends money: the higher the probability of default to one year of an enterprise, the greater the probability of loss associated with the loan and higher regulatory capital that banks must hold.
The probability of insolvency of a firm is estimated by the rating models, statistical models considered, but in other predominantly p, information relating to the accounts used by at the bank and information on the most significant economic and financial indicators of the company, which in general are related to the ability to create income, debt level is medium to long-and short-term liquidity with which it may be before periods of stress, the level of capitalization.
It is here that engages the indirect effect caused by the forced withdrawal from the TFR to swell the coffers bottomless INPS. Let's see how.
The company would find itself (I speak in the conditional because I still hope that the government does not proceed in this direction) to have no more available that money that normally needed for financing working capital (or to repay short term debt). This would imply an immediate need for liquidity to be addressed through greater use of the lines already granted by the bank, if there is a margin credit granted can still use, and / or by obtaining new credit lines short (basically the most risky for the bank). The first behavior would have a negative effect on the rating of the company as a major draw statistically indicates a tense business and hence a higher probability of default of that other conditions being equal, the second behavior would trigger a vicious vizioso per il quale l’azienda in difficoltà finanziarie (minore liquidità o, in molte situazioni, crisi di liquidità) che richiede la nuova linea, la richiede da una situazione svantaggiata rispetto a prima in quanto ora il suo rating (giudizio della banca sul rischio legato all’impresa) sarà peggiore.
Le banche a loro volta, valutando il maggior rischio legato all’impresa, avrebbero maggiori difficoltà nel concederglielo, e se comunque decidessero di erogarlo (come immagino avverrà) il costo per l’azienda (essendo anche il prezzo cui è concesso il credito parametrato giustamente al livello di rischio che la banca si assume nel concederlo) sarebbe nettamente superiore a what should have checked before switching on severance pay for a similar line, but most would be far greater than the use of self in the form of severance pay.
In small and medium enterprises where the contractor's work does tend to try to juggle at all times to make ends meet, do you think the cancellation, from evening to morning of this resource and its increasing cost of funding that impact this time on the ability to generate revenue or create the conditions for increased default rate of the segment at the national level, thus undermining the root of the Italian production system?
I think you and I am sure that the Minister economy that yesterday in an interview on the Sun 24 hours complained that companies do not realize how the financial aid they decreased with the tax wedge on labor costs, knowing full well that if he had done so through cooperation, the companies would have preferred to keep their severance pay and give up the tax wedge. At least the vast majority of those that are not already huge caravans for more extensive help from the government.